Winner of the Pulitzer Prize
“A startling work awesomely ambitious, faultlessly researched, daring in its thesis, and profound in its implications." — Business Week
"Magnificent. . . . everything a political biography should be." — Richmond Times-Dispatch
This rich and powerful biography is now given fresh relevance with a new introduction by the author that explores how Hirohito’s legacy persists in Japan to this day, and how US foreign policy in the region in the last ten years is informed by our troubled past with Japan and with Hirohito as a ruler specifically.
Trained since childhood to lead his nation as a living deity, Japan’s Emperor Hirohito cultivated the image of a reluctant, detached monarch, a façade which masked a fierce cunning and powerful ambition. Historian Herbert P. Bix has unearned hundreds of previously untapped documents including the unpublished letters and diaries of Hirohito’s royal court, tracing the key events of his sixty-three-year reign (1926 – 1989), and shedding light on his uniquely active yet self-effacing stewardship. Debunking the common image of Hirohito as a pawn in the hands of the military, Bix exposes the emperor’s personal involvement in every stage of the Pacific War. With rare insight, he shows how Hirohito avoided punishment for his nation’s defeat and how the Japanese people have struggled to come to terms with this dark chapter in their history.
|Product dimensions:||5.50(w) x 8.50(h) x 1.50(d)|
About the Author
Herbert P. Bix grew up in Winthrop, Massachusetts, and earned his Ph.D. in history and Far Eastern languages from Harvard University. For the past thirty years he has written extensively on modern and contemporary Japanese history in leading journals in the United States and Japan. He has taught Japanese history at a number of American and Japanese universities, most recently at Harvard, and is currently a professor in the Graduate School of Social Sciences at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo.
Read an Excerpt
The Boy, the Family, and the Meiji Legacies
Emperor Meiji's first grandson was born on April 29, 1901, within the Aoyama Palace in Tokyo. The moment was one of national delight, and virtually the entire nation celebrated, especially the court. The spirits of the reigning emperor's ancestors were duly notified that the blessed event had come to pass, and that the baby seemed hale and vigorous. An heir had been born; the ancient dynasty would continue, “unbroken,” for at least a few more generations. Scholars wise in the complexity of names and titles conferred. The infant, they announced, would be given the title “Prince Michi,” connoting one who cultivates virtue, and given the name “Hirohito,” taken from the terse Chinese aphorism that when a society is affluent, its people are content.
The young but chronically ill Crown Prince Yoshihito, next in line to the throne, was twenty-one that spring. The bloomingly fit Princess Sadako was just sixteen. In time she would bear him three more sons: Yasuhito and Nobuhito in 1902 and 1905 respectively, and Takahito (Prince Mikasa) in 1915.2 As for the baby's grandfather, Emperor Meiji, at forty-eight he had occupied the Chrysanthemum Throne for thirty-four years, and would continue to reign for eleven more.
According to custom, the children of Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, under the care of an appropriate surrogate. Yoshihito had been taken while still a very small infant to be raised the time-honored way. Shortly after his birth in 1879, he contracted cerebral meningitis. Meiji insisted that he be treated according to traditional (Chinese herbal) rather than Western medicalpractice.3 The baby failed to respond quickly and thereafter struggled through a hard, painful, often bedridden childhood. At different periods lasting several years he could seem more or less normal, but there were other times when he was hopelessly afflicted, and he was never robust. He became a royal dropout after managing somehow to graduate from the primary course of the Peers' School (Gakushuin) and to finish one year of middle school.
Could the origin of the crown prince's problems have been in part genetic? Emperor Meiji had fathered fifteen children by five different women, and lost eleven of them. Yoshihito, the third son, was the only male to survive, and his mother was not the empress but one of Meiji's many concubines. Inevitably the court suspected that hundreds of years of imperial inbreeding had resulted in a genetic defect of some sort that might show itself in the generation that would be sired by Yoshihito.
Naturally enough Meiji and his advisers took extreme care in choosing the princess who would marry Yoshihito and bear his offspring. Their ultimate choice was Princess Kujo Sadako, a young girl from one of the highest-ranking court families. The Kujo were a branch of the ancient Fujiwara, a lineage that reached back to the late twelfth century, when its founding ancestor had become regent for the then-reigning emperor. Sadako had excellent evaluations at the girls' division of the Peers' School. Intelligent, articulate, petite, she was especially admired for her pleasant disposition and natural dignity. In all her attributes she was just the opposite of Yoshihito.
The couple, who had met on several chaperoned occasions, were married in early 1900. As the years passed, Sadako grew in self-confidence and maturity, and the wisdom Meiji had shown in choosing her for his son was more and more praised.Emperor Meiji, in consultation with Yoshihito and Sadako, had decided that his grandson Hirohito should be reared in the approved modern manner, by a military man. It seemed wise, therefore, that the parental surrogate be a married army or navy officer who could provide the child not only with a good family atmosphere but also a martial influence. His first choice, Gen. Oyama Iwao, declined to undertake this heavy responsibility. They then turned to the elderly Count Kawamura Sumiyoshi, a retired vice admiral and ex–navy minister from the former Satsuma domain (a feudal fiefdom equivalent to a semisovereign state), and asked him to rear the child just as though he were his own grandson. Kawamura, a student of Confucian learning, could be further trusted because he was a distant relation by marriage of Yoshihito's mother.6 On July 7, the seventieth day after his birth, Hirohito was removed from the court and placed in the care of the Kawamura family. At the time Kawamura allegedly resolved to raise the child to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others, and immune from fear.7 With the exception of the last, these were characteristics that distinguished Hirohito throughout his life.
Hirohito was fourteen months old when his first brother'Yasuhito (Prince Chichibu)'joined him at the Kawamura mansion in Tokyo's hilly, sparsely populated Azabu Ward. The two infants remained with the Kawamuras for the next three and a half years, during which time three doctors, several wet nurses, and a large staff of servants carefully regulated every single aspect of their lives, from the Western-style food they ate to the specially ordered French clothing in which they were often dressed. Then in November 1904, at the height of the Russo-Japanese War, the sixty-nine-year-old Kawamura died. Hirohito, age three, and Chichibu, two, rejoined their parents'first at the imperial mansion in Numazu, Shizuoka prefecture, and later in the newly built Koson Palace within the large (two-hundred-acre) wall-enclosed compound of the crown prince's Aoyama Palace. In 1905 Nobuhito (Prince Takamatsu) was born, and toward the end of that year joined his brothers at their Koson Palace home. Their care was directed at first by Yoshihito's newly appointed grand chamberlain, Kido Takamasa; later their own special chamberlain was appointed.
During this earliest formative phase of Hirohito's life, one of the chief nurses attending him was twenty-two-year-old Adachi Taka, a graduate of the Tokyo Higher Teacher's School and later the wife of Hirohito's last wartime prime minister, Adm. Suzuki Kantaro. Taka could well have been called his substitute mother. Remembering this period later in her own life, Taka contrasted Hirohito's calm, deliberate, sedate nature and body movements as a baby with those of the more energetic, curious, and temperamental Chichibu.8 The brothers were indeed very different emotionally, both as little boys and as adults. But young Hirohito was more assertive than she intimates, while the mature Showa emperor was the embodiment of energetic monarchism, and much more driven by emotions than nurse Taka ever foresaw.
Table of Contents
|List of Maps||viii|
|Part I||The Prince's Education, 1901-1921|
|1||The Boy, the Family, and the Meiji Legacies||21|
|2||Cultivating an Emperor||57|
|3||Confronting the Real World||83|
|Part II||The Politics of Good Intentions, 1922-1930|
|4||The Regency and the Crisis of Taisho Democracy||127|
|5||The New Monarchy and the New Nationalism||171|
|6||A Political Monarch Emerges||205|
|Part III||His Majesty's Wars, 1931-1945|
|7||The Manchurian Transformation||235|
|8||Restoration and Repression||279|
|10||Stalemate and Escalation||359|
|11||Prologue to Pearl Harbor||387|
|12||The Ordeal of Supreme Command||439|
|Part IV||The Unexamined Life, 1945-1989|
|14||A Monarchy Reinvented||533|
|15||The Tokyo Trial||581|
|16||Salvaging the Imperial Mystique||619|
|17||The Quiet Years and the Legacies of Showa||647|
What People are Saying About This
This remarkable study is indispensable for the understanding of Japan and its place in Asia in the past century. It provides new perspectives on a wide range of crucial issues, among them, the actual role of the Emperor, the origins and termination of the Pacific War, and the forging of the postwar Japanese polity through the interactions of the American occupation, the Emperor and his circle, and the emerging civil society. It is a truly outstanding contribution.
(Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, M.I.T.)
As Herbert Bix documents meticulously Emperor Hirohito was in every sense of the word a war-time military leader deeply involved in the merciless attacks on China and the bombing of Pearl Harbor. He escaped censure because of the Cold War but the Cold War is now over. For those who want to understand history and modern events such as the relationships between China and Japan this is a must read.
(Lester C. Thurow, Lemelson Professor of Management and Economics, the Sloan School, M.I.T.)
Drawing on the wealth of fascinating new Japanese materials that have become available since Hirohito's death, Herbert Bix has given us a riveting portrait of the engaged, intense, and complex man who stood at the very center of Japan's turbulent century of war and peace. In this excellent and incisive study, the emperor's new clothes are stunning to behold.
(John W. Dower, author of Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II)
Bix has written the definitive account of Hirohito's extraordinary reign as emperor of Japan. His pursuit of previously unknown Japanese sources and his ability to situate Hirohito as both man and political force have given us a compelling portrait. The biography is revisionist in the best sensenot an 'expose' but a challenge to nearly all our assumptions about the role played by Hirohito in shaping Japan's turbulent century. It will become the standard work on the subject.
(Michael Schaller, author of Altered States: The U.S. and Japan since the Occupation)
This is an important and controversial book, sharply challenging the reigning view of Hirohito. Where others have described a reluctant warrior, inclined toward pacifism, committed to the constitution, and unwilling to take actions of political significance, Herbert Bix shows us a far more complex and consequential monarch. This book is must reading for all those interested in the history of the twentieth century world.
(Andrew Gordon, Director, Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University)
Reading Herbert Bix's pioneering inquiry into Emperor Hirohito's life should make Americans angry. For the past fifty-five years, senior officials of the United States government have systematically lied to the American and Japanese peoples about Hirohito's true role in public affairs during the 20th century. The overarching theme of this monumental work is Hirohito's failure to publicly acknowledge his own moral, political, and legal accountability for the long war fought in his name. The result today is Japan's continuing denial of responsibility for the war crimes it visited on its neighbors. This is one of the most important books ever written on World War II in the Pacific. It is also a major work of political philosophy.
(Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire)
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
This is a political, not personal biography, as little of Hirohito the man emerges from these pages. Perhaps that is just as well, since Hirohito the man seems to be completely subsumed by his role as emperor, the changing meaning of which Bix amply and adequately demonstrates. For a biography designed to place Hirohito's reign in proper historical perspective, the book at times lacks proper historical background - it is not sufficient to contrast Hirohito's reign with that of his grandfather, the Meiji Emperor, whose reign was so transformative of the Japanese monarchy. What of the emperors who preceded Meiji? What was the monarchy like under them? Moreover, for a reader essentially unfamiliar with the 'traditional' portrait of Hirohito as removed and uninvolved, the book rarely indicates where its findings specifically overturn that image. Rarely does one find a sentence along the following lines: 'In contrast to the prevailing view that Hirohito was not involved in matter X (source), document Y clearly indicates that he was'. One could read the entire book without getting the sense that it is 'revisionist', 'revolutionary' or anything of the sort. In fact, because of the lack of mention of the 'conventional wisdom' of his lack of culpability, the actions of many of the characters in dealing with Hirohito is almost inexplicable. Having said that, the book is meticulously detailed and well researched with one significant caveat - as Bix makes clear, Hirohto's own papers are sealed, and certain US Government files on Hirohito are still unavailable. These sources would likely be outstandingly rich, but perhaps the very fact of their remaining secret confirms Bix's revisionist portrait.
This Pulitzer Prize winning history explains in detail the intricacies of decision making in Japan and just as important, tells us how they saw themselves and the cultural prism through which they viewed our actions and our decisions as well as those of Great Britain. This is the best history of modern Japan I have ever read and I learned more reading this book than I learned reading a dozen other books on the subject. This is actually one of the best books I have read.
Since Hirohito left virtually no writings that would have given substance to his views, Bix has had to look closely at the diaries left by those who dealt with him, and at an avalanche of other documentation, much of it in Japanese, and from this infer a character for Hirohito. There are some direct quotations but they are rare. My favorite bits so far: (1) the overview of Hirohito's education and the review of his teachers; (2) the degree to which the military in Japan in the 1930-40s was completely out of control; (3) the subject's maddening penchant for vacillation; (4) the final damning word on his complicity in the crimes of his nation; (5) the view of across the board governmental dysfunction. It's an astonishing story. Hirohito was left to sanction his army's wild and murderous caprices at home and abroad after the fact, or risk looking inept. When he finally steps out of the shadows to disperse the rebellion by his young army officers in 1936Only when Japan's young army officers rebel in 1936 and kill those advisors closest to him--it is believed he is manipulated by them--does he take action. He issues an order for the rioters to disperse and has 17 of them hanged. Hirohito almost always worked through intermediaries. So this issuance of such a direct imperial order is a shocking moment in the book. It is also utterly out of keeping with H's character. Right now, midway through the book, it's 1937 and the Japanese army has just entered Shanghai. The war is starting in earnest. My only problem with the text so far is that Bix does not tell us what the various personnel involved day to day with Hirohito looked like. This is such a simple thing, and here it would have helped the reader to remember them the next time they appeared in the text. But all Bix gives us about these individuals is their political positions. So they tend to blur together. No question, this is quibble. Bix has done an astonishing job. Highly recommended. (N.B. There's another book, this one by David Bergamini called JAPAN'S IMPERIAL CONSPIRACY, which has been pretty much debunked over the years. Bergamini was interned during the Second World War and consequently had an axe to grind afterward. His conclusions are therefore suspect. He did not possess the scholarly apparatus that Bix has. Yet Bergamini is a fine writer who does an excellent job with the individual profiles: Konoe, Saionji, etc. One could easily read Bergamini's just for the individual profiles as a helpful adjunct to the Bix text.)
This book, while it took a while to get going, really did provide a good, complete look at Hirohito. The author started with the emperor's education and grooming to be a real absolute monarch. This part felt a bit tedious to me, and probably could have stuck less at certain points that more concerned Meiji and Taisho, but it does a good job of setting up how he came to hold the beliefs he held.The next part, where he takes over the throne and plays a big role in the application of power, is the part that comes as the biggest surprise, and is given the largest part of the book. It shows Hirohito's desire to increase his empire, but not explicitly come out and state it. He generally took a militarist line, and when the military acted up, tended not to overly censure them. In all arenas, he acted in a way to increase his power if he could; since he had less direct control over civilian affairs of state, and wanted to cater to the military movement that used him as a nationalist-fervor generating device, he ended up taking positions that led to full-scale military takeover of the government, helping to end the nascent Taisho democracy movement.Further, it's clear that he didn't really care about military or social order, as long as ultimate success accrued to him and the empire. When officers acted on their own or countermanded orders, as long as they succeeded, they ended up being rewarded with imperials rescripts or higher positions. If they acted against his interests, however, or if they failed, then the fall could be very steep.As the war expanded, eventually he went for expanded war against Japan's traditional allies, the US and Britain, largely because they were curtailing the efforts of Japan to expand the empire. While it seems that he was initially hesitant, he came to the point where he was largely happy starting the war, and remained so for the first several months, when things were going well. Bix argues convincingly that the unexpectedly rapid success, with everything going according to plan or better, led to overreaching on the part of Japan and Hirohito, who felt that they should keep expanding rather than consolidating the gains made. If they had turned to defense in early 1942, rather than looking to take a bit more and deal a decisive defeat to the US, the war could have ended up differently.Bix points out that the only one ever in command of all the military information was Hirohito, and yet he was the one who refused to give up and to push for a decisive final battle up until the end, despite knowing that they had less and less chance of any success. He changed military orders to be more aggressive, thus sealing the doom of many battles. It's not that he had no working knowledge of tactics; it was more that he felt that, with great Japanese spirit, they could overcome the odds, as had happened in the Russo-Japanese War under Meiji.Postwar, Hirohito moved to make himself seem indispensible in keeping the country together, collaborated with MacArthur and other Americans to make sure that he was not held culpable for the entry into the war or other military decisions, and tried to reframe himself as a symbol of peace. The extent to which the Tokyo trials of war criminals were engineered to leave him out, I was already rather aware of from Dower's Embracing Defeat, but this went into more detail. Bix claims that the trials felt incomplete because there was an emperor-sized hole at the top of the hierarchy that no one was willing to address, and I can see this.Even after the 1947 constitution consigned him to a symbol of Japanese unity, Hirohito always longed for more power, and agitated behind the scenes for reform, or at the least for an unofficial advisory capacity, for much of his life. He also, even at the end of his life, sought to keep his name out of war responsibility, although he could not quite accomplish it. Still, he avoided it for much of his reign, which in itself is an accomplishment.Bix's narrative
Thorough argument that Hirohito was responsible for the Pacific War. Skimps on post-occupation history. Occasionally feels like the author is stretching the evidence a bit too far.
Herbert Bix's biography of Emperor Hirohito of Japan is an outstanding work, but it must be read with caution, a critical eye and an open mind. The work is permeated with a sense of Bix's righteous indignation at Hirohito's escape from censure for his part in Japan's role in China and in the Second World War and this seems to color his judgment when facts grow thin and motivations are evaluated. What Bix contributes to the historical record regarding Hirohito, the Japanese military, and Japan's wars is important and revealing. In Western culture the term 'emperor' connotes Rome with a sort of English royalty superimposed on it, a blend of the two greatest empires of the Western world. What gets lost in this merger is the memory that the emperor in the Roman system enjoyed a godhead and that the empire was partly a theocracy. Theocracy is a missing element in most evaluations of the seemingly insane strategic decisions that governed Japan's entry into, atrocities during, and conduct of World War II. The blind faith that overrode rationality in upper echelons of the Army and Navy makes more sense in the light of the theocratic Shintoist emperor system. Bound up with a system of belief in a state headed by a living god, the racist inhumanity of Japanese atrocities becomes more understandable, but not justifiable. The willingness to 'die for the Emperor' in banzai charges and kamikaze flights also becomes more clear. But where Bix's work raises question marks is in his evaluation of Hirohito's role. While Bix has unearthed an emperor who definitely had a hand in government and the fatal decisions that propelled Japan into war, and bore unacknowledged responsibility for those decisions, he has not necessarily proven Hirohito to be their animating force. But that is the light in which Bix evaluates those missing elements of the record that call for speculation. An alternative interpretation occurs which, while not going as far as Bix's evaluation, does not divorce Hirohito from his responsibility. Where Bix sees Hirohito as an animating force in the actions of Japan's ruling elites and militarists, too often that animation comes in the form of ratifying faits accompli. Too often intentions that Bix would have us believe were formed by Hirohito were initiated by others, sometimes without Hirohito's foreknowledge. What occurs is that, perhaps, Hirohito did not hold the initiative in the Japanese government. What becomes apparent in Bix's description of Hirohito's upbringing, personality and conduct, is that he was so insulated from reality that he never enjoyed an undistorted view of the world. He was certainly not the disconnected figurehead who only stepped in at the last moment to save Japan from more atomic bombs and partition with the Soviets. He was definitely active in charting Japan's course, but he did not necessarily hold the compass. Bix would have us see Hirohito as the ultimate master of indirect rule, served by private intelligence systems to feed him the truth and manipulating all from behind the scenes in ways to make governmental decision appear to be the unanimous work of others presented to him only for his purely ceremonial rubber stamp. But was this a mastermind at work, or a relatively intelligent but confused and uncertain man trying to keep his head above water in a political/religious system he nominally enjoyed power over, but in which his military routinely indulged in acts of grand insubordination, assassination and mutiny? Japanese emperors had been deposed before, and while Hirohito nominally controlled the military, it obeyed when it chose and the ruling elites talked behind his back of the emperor's less than godlike bearing. Had he been other than the awkward intellectual he was, Hirohito might w